RESPONSIBILITY FOR THE WAR.^
BY FRED.

A LADY

remarked

to

me

C.

CONYBEARE.

lately that

it

was too

terrible to think

that our brave fellows should be bearing the hardships of

the trenches, should be enduring

wounds and

death, for

any but

Our sufferings alone, she urged, prove
a wholly righteous cause.
and she shook with wrath when I
our
side;
that justice is on
test
the Germans could be shown to
suggested that by the same
which may properly be described as
tribalism, was all very well as long as we had little except the
lies and insincerities of our public men and press with which to
combat the Germans, but now that we are putting into the field
some two million good soldiers to prove that we are as brave and

be in the right.

Her

attitude,

capable of fighting as they are, surely the time
rationalists

anyhow can make

a

more

stand the course of events than Mr.

Gorham have

come when

is

serious attempt to under-

McCabe and Mr.

Charles T.

done.

admit at the outset that by invading Belgium the Germans
This is so, even if we allow

I

us no choice but to intervene.

left

article was accompanied by the following personal letter to the
"Dear Dr. Cams You and I have been good friends in the past and
have worked in our respective spheres for the humanizing and enlightening
of opinion in both hemispheres. I therefore invite you to publish in The Open
Court the enclosed MS. together with this communication to yourself. It was
originally sent to the Literary Guide, the monthly organ of the Rationalist
^

This

editor

:

—

league, for I did not see why England's case should be entirely left, in its coluse of the
umns, to the tender mercies of Mr. McCabe and Mr. Gorham.
English White Paper however was too frank for the taste of that journal, and
its editors refused to publish it.
"Germany at present is resounding with hymns of hatred against England,
but I hope and believe that Germans will come to see that my countrymen
were as a whole averse to war until by the invasion of a weak and defenceless
Belgium they were goaded into it. The fact that the German ambassador in
London on August 1 was ready to give an assurance that Belgium would not
be molested if we would undertake to be neutral, proves that the passage over
her soil of German armies was not the unavoidable military necessity which

My
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with Sir E. Grey that their action "was not wanton," and that
"Germany feared that if she did not occupy Belgium France

might do so."

Mr. Lloyd George has recently assured us that for

him, as for ninety-five percent of the business men of London,
Belgium made the whole difference, and that nothing short of the

have inclined him or them to war.
His attitude is and was my own, and I maintain that the Times
of March 8 takes up an immoral position when it writes that
"Herr von Bethmann-Hollweg is quite right" in what he says of
us, that as "in the great war we did not lavish our gold from love
violation of her neutrality could

German or of Austrian liberty or out of sheer altruism," so in
this war we have "invested it for our own safety and our own

of

Times
mitments were rewarded by
Yet I venture
this war.
August 3 in the House of
the late Mr. Gladstone, as

advantage"

"We

and, the

;

have an interest

in

adds, as then "on the whole our com-

an adequate return," so they will be
to

think

what turned

Commons was

the

scale

in

on

the eloquent appeal of

Grey repeated it. Here it is
the independence of Belgium which is
Sir E.

wider than that which we may have in the literal operation of the
It is found in the answer to the question whether,
guarantee.

under the circumstances of the case, this country, endowed as it
is with influence and power, would quietly stand by and witness
the perpetration of the direst crime that ever stained the pages of

and thus become participators

history,

in the sin."

If

Grey had

Herr von Bethmann-Hollweg on August 4 asserted it to be. In any case it
meant that Belgium would be turned into a shambles. I hold that Sir E. Grey
did wrong in binding England by his secret engagements (unknown even to
the English cabinet and probably to the king) to take part against Germany in
a war over an issue which did not concern us.
He erred in making any defensive and offensive secret alliance with France, until the latter power should
have composed her quarrel with Germany. Still the fact remains, duly attested
by our own and even by the French diplomatic books, that he and his secret
policy would have been cast aside by our cabinet, parliament and nation, had
not the German General Staff with cynical disregard of justice and international law actually played into his and Sazonof's hands.
Had that Staff
known a little more of human nature, they would have foreseen that their
aggression on Belgium, premeditated and planned for years, was the one thing
that would light a flame among us, and alienate the sympathies both of America and Italy.
They deliberately provoked us to war, as, I consider, Sazonof
provoked the poor Kaiser and I fear there is nothing for us now but to fight
;

May

suggest that you should print in your journal the passages
which I have marked in the current number of the Candid Quarterly. This is
a journal edited by Mr. Thos. Gibson Bowles, and it may be said to represent
the "Young Tory" party. I believe that its stern condemnation of Sir E. Grey's
policy is well merited, though I do not see eye to eye with the editor in many
matters, and, particularly, in the essentially aggressive designs of the present
Kaiser against England. I am yours sincerely, Fred. C. Conybeare, M.A.,
F.B.A., Honorary Fellow 'Univ. Coll. Oxford, Hon. Dr. Theol. Giessen, Hon.
it

out.

I

—

LL.D.

St.

Andrews."
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dangled this war before our Parliament as an "investment," he
would have found few to support him.
Now my object here is to point out that we should not now
be at war, and that Europe would probably not be at war with
herself

the

if

first

Sir E-

Grey had taken up

and stuck to

this ethical

standpoint from

it.

The war originated in a quarrel between Austria and Servia.
In such a war were we under any obligation, moral or material,
to join? As to the moral obligation. Grey declared on July 20 that
for us or any other power to "be dragged into a war by Servia
would be detestable" (White Paper
"if

in the

1).

course of the present grave

We

assured Austria that

crisis

our point of view

should sometimes differ from hers, this would arise not from want
of sympathy with the many just complaints which Austria-Hungary

had against Servia," etc. (White Paper 62). On July 29 (ibid. 91)
Grey told the Austrian ambassador in London that he "did not
wish to discuss the merits of the question between Austria and
Servia."

Were we

then under material obligations to go to war over

Servia?

On

this point Sir

G. Buchanan, our ambassador at St. Peters-

On

July 24 he was urged by Sazonof and
"to proclaim our solidarity with
there,
ambassador
French
the
"They continued to press me," he writes
Russia and France."
(White Paper 6), "for a declaration of complete soHdarity of His
Majesty's government with French and Russian governments."
He reports his answer thus: "Personally I saw no reason to
expect any declaration of solidarity from His Majesty's government that would entail an unconditional engagement on their part
burg, was emphatic.

and France by force of arms. Direct British
interests in Servia were nil, and a war on behalf of that country
would never be sanctioned by British public opinion."
It is certain that if Grey had remained true to this twofold
standpoint, that neither duty nor interests called upon us to intervene, France would not have stirred, for she relied upon our aid,

to support Russia

and she would have held back her ally Russia. The fire in the
heather might have been thus stamped out from the beginning,
and never have become a vast conflagration consuming the whole
of Europe.
It

more
first

may

be said: "Oh, but

to humiliate Russia."

we

could not allow

Germany once

But Austria gave assurances from the

that she only wished to chastise Servia

and not touch her

in-
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(White Paper 18, 57, 62, 64, 72, 75, 79,
There was therefore not involved any particular humiliation of Russia, which in 1876. 1878, 1897, had in special conventegrity or sovereign rights
137, etc.)-

tions thrice assigned Servia to the Austrian sphere of influence in

the Balkans, reserving Bulgaria as her

own

sphere.

The Austrians

had a better quarrel with Servia than we ever had with the Boers,
and Russia less excuse for throwing her aegis over Servia than
Germany would have had in 1900 for throwing hers over the TransBut in view of Sir E. Grey's repeated disclaimers of all
vaal.
interest in the rights and wrongs of Servia it is superfluous to
press this point. He not less emphatically denied that France had
any cause to interfere in a Servian squabble. For example, on
July 31 (ibid. 116) he writes to Sir F. Bertie, our ambassador at
Paris, that "in this case France is being drawn into a dispute which
is

not hers."

so, why did he not warn France from the first that
merely as Russia's ally, chose to go to war with Germany,
she would do so at her own risk? Why did he not point out that,
as it was not her dispute, the Germans could not be accused of

That being

if

she,

an unprovoked attack on her if they defended
It is
into which she might follow Russia?
France was bound by her treaty with Russia.
out, and she did not allege her treaty but her
for accepting
that Russia

themselves in a war
useless to urge that

That was her lookinterests as a reason

war with Germany. Is any one so naif as
would go out of her way to aid France

circumstances?

Would Russia

suppose

to
in

similar

ever intervene vi et armis to save

England from any humiliation whatever?
Russia from the first resolved to take up the quarrel of Servia
and assert a protectorate over her as against Austria, and on July
25 mobilized her southern armies against Austria

Germany

categorically

warned her

that she

—

this,

although

would protect her

ally.

Austria declared war on Servia on July 28 and on July 29 proceeded to bombard Belgrade. Then at last Grey yielded to Sazonof 's
appeal that he should declare our "complete solidarity" with France

and Russia, and he warned Germany that if France went to war
we must intervene on her side and could not stand aside (White
Paper 89, 102, 111, 116, 119).
Till now Germany, while insisting that Austria intended only
to chastise Servia and not impair her sovereign rights or appropriate any of her territory, had been intransigent in her attitude.
Ex post facto she had approved of Austria's note to Servia, and
toward Russia she assumed an air of "you can take it or leave it."
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to bhifif her as in 1909. At the same time she was ready
and France, if they wanted to fight her. Sazonof
Russia
to fight
Cambonson their side equally intended to fight her
and the two
of the weak man with the strong fleet,
possession
get
if they could

She hoped

Grey's warning of July 29 very
ultimatum
to Germany and an asan
It was
seriously.
impartial
witness, the Belgian
an
and
Russia
surance of support to
I'Escaille,
wrote on the
Baron
the
de
Petersburg,
minister at St.
Brussels
that
on that day
at
government
evening of July 30 to his
Sir E. Grey.

Both

sides took

in eflfect

;

people there were "firmly convinced, nay they had a positive assurance to the effect, that England would support France. This assur-

ance of support was of enormous importance, and had contributed
not a little to encourage the war party." And he adds: "Although

on the day before there were such divergencies of opinion in the
Czar's council of ministers that the ukase ordering mobilization

was delayed, a change of scene subsequently took place, the war
party gained the upper hand, and to-day (July 30) at four o'clock
The army, which is
the order for mobilization was published.
conscious of its strength, is full of enthusiasm and reposes great
hopes on the progress it has achieved since the Japanese war. The
navy is so far from having realized its program of reconstruction

and reorganization that one cannot count upon
the reason

why

so

much importance

is

it.

And

this is just

attached to the assurance

of support given by England."^

But just

in proportion as Sir

the hopes of Sazonof,

it

set herself to conciliate

sent her

Edward

who

instantly

Thus she
m. on the morning

Russia and buy off England.

Ambassador, Count Pourtales,

of July 30, to Sazonof.

Grey's warning raised

depressed those of Germany,

He

at 2 a.

"completely broke down," so

we

read

(White Paper 97), "on seeing that war was inevitable. He appealed to M. Sazonof to make some suggestion which he could
telegraph to the German government as a last hope."
It was now Sazonof's turn to bluff Germany, and he dictated a
French ambassadors in Berlin and London.
first paragraphs of this dispatch are equally interesting with those
which I cite
"M. le Ministre. Yesterday [July 29] and the day before have been passed
in expectation of the events which were bound to follow upon the declaration
of war by Austria on Servia.
"Most contradictory news has been in circulation, without it being possible to distinguish truth from falsehood, about the Imperial Government's
*

'The

intentions. What is certain is that Germany has endeavored, noless here than in
Vienna, to find any means whatever, to avoid a general conflict; but she has

been confronted, on one side, with the obstinate determination of the Vienna
Cabinet not to yield an inch, and, on the other, with the distrust felt by the
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formula to Portales by which Austria was "to recognize that her conwith Servia had assumed the character of a question of European
interest and declare herself ready to eliminate from her ultimatum
flict

(to Servia)

Servia."

points which violate the principle of sovereignty of

This done, "Russia engaged to stop

all

military prepara-

tions."

The Austrian demand which

violated Servian sovereignty

was

on the Servian court of enquiry
into the assassination of the Archduke. He was not to have judicial
that an Austrian assessor should

sit

or executive powers, but only to see that the enquiry was not a

mock

one.

At Hodeida

recently the Italians similarly

of Turkey that their consul should

sit

demanded

on the Turkish court of

demand was instantly granted.
The Germans spent July 30 in urging Austria

enquiry, and the

Sazonof's terms.

to

consider

Austria had broken off negotiations with

St.

Petersburg, and accordingly Bethmann-Hollweg in a note addressed
to her that

day used these words

:

"We

cannot expect Austria-

Hungary to negotiate with Servia, with which she is in a
war. The refusal, however, to exchange views with St.

state of

Peters-

burg would be a grave mistake. We are indeed ready to fulfil our
duty.
As an ally we must, however, refuse to be drawn into a
world conflagration through Austria-Hungary not respecting our
advice."
And the German ambassador was told to address this
warning to Berchtold, the Austrian chancellor, "with all emphasis
and great seriousness."*
Petersburg Cabinet of Austria's assurances that her only idea is to punish
Servia, and not possess herself of that country.
"M. Sazonof has declared that is was impossible for Russia not to hold
herself ready and not to mobilize, that however these preparations were not
directed against Germany.
This morning an official communication to the
journals announces that 'the reservists have been called to arms in a certain
number of provinces.' Knowing the reserve usually practised in official
Russian communications, it is easy to infer that the mobilization is general.
The German ambassador has declared to-day that he has exhausted the endeavors for peace which since Saturday he has unremittingly pursued, and that
he is now left without any hope. I have been told that the English embassy
has expressed itself in the same manner. Great Britain has as a last resort
proposed arbitration. M. Sazonof has replied: 'We ourselves proposed it to
Austria-Hungary and she refused it.' To the proposal for a conference Germany replied by proposing an understanding between the Cabinets. One may
well ask oneself if it is not the case that all parties want war and are only
trying to delay its declaration a little while in order to gain time.
England
began by giving out that she did not intend to be drawn into a conflict. Sir
George Buchanan openly said so. To-day at Petersburg people are firmly convinced etc."
* Mr. M. P. Price in his work The Diplomatic
History of the War shows
that this telegram is genuine, although it has been impugned.
Yet Mr. Gorham quotes with approval Mr. Jas. M. Beck's denial that the Kaiser ever "gave
the world the text of any advice he gave the Austrian officials."

THE OPEN COURT.

400

Emperor Franz Joseph
sode

—had Sazonof's note

—the

enfant terrible of the whole epi-

(modified in certain ways by Grey, White

Paper 120) laid before him by Berchtold on the morning of July 31.
old man's habit is to transact important affairs of state at
He so far yielded that Sazonof at once informed Grey
5 a. m.
through his agent in London, De Etter, of his satisfaction at the
fact (White Paper 133) that "the Austro-Hungarian ambassador
had declared the readiness of his government to discuss the subSazonof adds that
stance of the Austrian ultimatum to Servia."

The

"it

is

desirable that the discussions should take place in

with the participation of the great powers."

He

London

also "hopes that

the British government will assume the direction of these discussions.
of Europe would be thankful to them." The extent to
which Austria would have yielded to Russian demands would of
course have depended on the course of these "discussions," which

The whole

unhappily never took place.
that Sazonof in this moment of diplopleased to yield to the appeal which
might
have
been
triumph
matic
making
been
to him for two days to stay
the German emperor had
himself.
For some reason or
his military preparations against
appeal
he
was too much afraid
another Grey would not second this
of Sazonof ever to oft'er him advice, and even as early as July 24
had made the "stiff" tone of the note to Servia an excuse for refusing "to exercise any moderating influence on Russia" (White
Paper 10), and our ambassador at Vienna was told from the first

One would have thought

;

(White Paper 26)
chose the

moment

to support the policy of Sazonof.

The

latter

now

of his triumph to complete his mobilization against

This was early on the morning of July 31. As early as
Germans had warned Russia that if she mobilized they
must do so too and, they added, "mobilization means war." Russia
paid no heed, with the result that at midnight on July 31 the Kaiser,
seized with panic, gave her 12 hours to demobilize, and getting no

Germany.

July 26 the

;

answer, declared war late on August
to mobilize in his turn.

I

on which day he also began

1,

do not seek

to palliate the guilt of the

do aver that Sazonof had
done all he could to provoke the poor man to declare war, and
might have declared war himself if the Kaiser had not been in
Kaiser

in

thus rushing into war, but

I

such a hurry.

The English Cabinet was

still

averse to war.^ and, in spite of

" Mr. Lloyd George recently made the following statement
"This I know
true
after the guarantee given that the German fleet would not attack
the coast of France or annex any French territory, I would not have been

is

—

:
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Grey's secret undertakings to France, was willing to be neutral if
Germany would give, like l'>ance, an assurance not to violate ]5el-

gium's neutrality. They accordingly sent Grey on August 1 "to make
proposals [to the German ambassador] for England's neutrality

Germany being at war with France as well as
The ambassador immediately offered the required
assurance on condition that Grey would make a definite statement
even

in the event of

with Russia."

with regard to our neutrality.

Grey however refused "to be neutral

on that condition alone." The ambassador then "pressed him to
He even
formulate conditions" on which we would be neutral.
might
her
colonies
of
France
and
of
both
integrity
the
that
offered
have
might
also
Grey
beaten.
was
France
in
case
be respected,
keep
should
German
fleet
the
that
condition
the
asked and obtained
keep his hands free
and the next morning
(August 2) he did not even deem it worth his while to inform our
Cabinet of the German overtures of the day before, though a
majority thereof would certainly have embraced them. The Germans now made up their minds that we were really going to join
France against them and, thinking that they might as well be hung
for a sheep as a laml). went through Belgium. That issue swallowed
up all our earlier negotiations, and we had to go to war. The only
way to have kept out of it would have been to close with the offers
made by Germany on August 1." But Grey resolved not to do that,
and the Cabinet never heard of them in time.
It cannot be denied that on the morning of July 31 Russia had
On July 27 (White Paper 55)
obtained all she had asked for.
Sazonof told our ambassador that all he wanted was that Servia's
"territorial integrity must be guaranteed and her rights as a sovereign state respected," and by the 31st not only were these terms
conceded by Austria, but Germany had oft'ered to see that they
itself in the

North Sea.

But Grey wanted

and refused to be neutral on any conditions

to

:

;

a party to a declaration of war had Belgium not been invaded and I can say
the same thing for most, if not all, of my colleagues. If Germany had been
wise, she would not have set foot on Belgian soil the Liberal Government,
then, would not have intervened."
;

;

A

Germany and Austria with France and Russia was likely to
emergence of many unforeseen issues and contingencies which
made it unwise of England beforehand to tie herself down unconditionally to
permanent neutrality. For example the war might have spread to Dutch,
Danish and Swedish soil, even America might have been drawn in as well as
Italy and Turkey. Nevertheless, since we had no army with which to repell a
German advance through Belgium, I regret that Grey did not accept Lychnowski's overtures. We should have saved her from the excesses of German
'

war

of

result in the

Schrecklichkeit.
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were carried out when the punitive expedition was ended.

But

neither side trusted the other.

Grey's dispatches prove that his poHcy was to join in the war
if it

became general, and

especially

if

France elected

to

go

in.

This

he intended to do, Belgium or no Belgium. I believe it was an unwise policy. The Servian bone was foul and rotten, and stunk in
his nostrils as long as only

one big dog was growling over it, but as
it suddenly acquired for

soon as the other big dogs began to snarl,
him an almost sacramental importance.

Germany,

if

we may

believe the Italian Foreign Minister,

Juliano (White Paper 80), was

all

San

along "really anxious for good

;"

and Sir E. Goschen at Berlin, in conchancellor on August 4, remarked that
it "was part of the tragedy" that the two nations should "fall apart
just at the moment when the relations between them had been more
friendly and cordial than they had been for years." One may well
ask, if this was so, why Sir E. Grey did not accept the German overtures for peace three days earlier or at least give our very pacifist
Cabinet a chance to accept them. But he evidently agreed with his
friend M. Paul Cambon, the French ambassador in London (White
Paper 119, July 31), that "in 1870 we had made a great mistake
in allowing an enormous increase of German strength, and we
relations with ourselves

versation with the

German

now be repeating the mistake," if we did not attack Germany
when we could. This is the moral standpoint which prevails in a

should

thieves' kitchen.

How

We

made

it,

unwillingly and by accident, our own.

the future historian will view this

war we hardly can

say, but I suspect he will blame Russia and Germany about equally.
He will recognize that our House of Commons went to war to

weak and oppressed, and that, except for the violation
we would either not have gone to war at all, or have
done so with little enthusiasm. He will recognize that the Germans
honestly believed they were fighting a defensive war, which was to
rid them of the double incubus of Russia and France holding their
loaded revolvers at them on two frontiers. France will be rightly
rescue the

of Belgium,

credited with a passion

for revanche

;

his blind traditional loyalty for his "Little

the Russian peasant with

Father" the Czar. Finally

the historian will conclude that any one of the five combatants with

a

little

good-will could have prevented the

war

at the outset of the

any subsequent phase of it up to August 1 and he
will
all alike for the bloody popular convulsions, the plague
and famine, the uprising of the East against the West, of the

and
blame

crisis

at

;
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yellow races against the white, the wasting feuds between race

war between

and

race, the

ity,

the destruction of

overthrow of faith in humanschemes of social amelioration, the general bankruptcy of states and individuals, the revival of superstition, the decay of literature and art, and countless other evils
which will follow in its train all over Europe.
all

classes, the

